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Abstract: The explanatory capacity of ideas has been contested on two grounds.  
First, ideas have been dismissed as epiphenomenal.  Second, ideational explanations 
have been criticized for limited importance that they ascribe to agency.  This article 
examines the involvement of the European Commission in previously unchartered 
territory, namely the regulation of professional sport in Europe.  It demonstrates that 
in conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty created by the need to implement broad 
Treaty-based principles in new areas of socio-economic activity, ideas, first, act as 
road maps that direct the executive activity of the European Commission, legitimize 
it, and set limits to it by identifying the relevant deeply embedded conceptions of the 
nature of a given activity and by linking them to a wider, historically defined 
normative order.  Second, ideas are also powerful political weapons used by political 





Existing analyses of the role of ideas - defined here as ‘principled beliefs’ that 
‘specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust’ and 
‘translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action’1– in 
the policy process portray them as significant factors that affect political outcomes.  
Ideas do so (i) by providing ‘road maps’ that guide political action, (ii) by 
establishing focal points that resolve problems in cases of multiple equilibria and (iii) 
through the institutions that embody them.2  This is unsurprising given that ‘politics 
finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty-men collectively 
wondering what to do […] Governments not only “power” […] they also puzzle.  
Policy making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both 
deciding and knowing’ as Hugh Heclo put it.3  If this is so in the embedded context 
of the nation state, demand for guidance is likely to be stronger in the evolving 
system of the European Union (EU) where policy traditions, national and 
transnational interests often clash.  This demand is unsurprising because integration 
often proceeds by means of the implementation of broad principles (such as the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and people) in specific areas of activity, even 
when the latter are not explicitly mentioned in the relevant EU legislation.  This is 
when a comparatively high degree of uncertainty as to how far change ought to go, 
increases demand for guidance that can stem from ideas and the broader, historically 
defined normative order.   
 
This article seeks to explore this process and draws empirical material from the 
regulation of professional sport in the EU.  This is not a core area of concern for the 
EU but one in which the EU became intensively involved in the 1990s.  The article 
focuses specifically on the regulation of the system of international transfers because 
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the involvement of the EU in this area exemplifies its activity in other areas of sport-
related regulation4 namely, the reliance on Treaty-based provisions regarding 
competition policy5 for the regulation of a sector which, as key actors see it, is a 
‘special case’ – sport, they argue, is much more than an industry, or a market.   
 
The article advances two claims.  First, the notion that sport is much more than a 
mere economic activity has guided and limited the EU’s involvement in the 
regulation of this activity.  Second, this happened not only because this idea is deeply 
embedded in the traditional regulation of sport in Europe, but also because it had 
powerful ‘carriers’ who, despite their unwillingness to see the EU become involved 
in this area, were forced to forge an uneasy compromise with the promoters of 
change.  In that sense, this article seeks to add to a growing body of literature that 
highlights the political relevance of ideas in general, and (i) their role as ‘weapons’6 
as well as (ii) the relative importance of their ‘carriers’7.   
 
The importance of this case study for our understanding of the broader policy process 
is twofold.  On the one hand, the development of the EU has created a new 
opportunity structure which has generated new constraints and opportunities both for 
public and private actors.  On the other hand, far from being the ‘runaway 
Eurocracy’ often depicted in both the academic literature and the media, the EU’s 
institutions (in this case the Commission) often have to contend with immaterial 
forces that guide and constrain political activity.  As a result, institution- or power-
based analyses of the politics of integration ought to take into account immaterial 
factors.  In more general terms, this article seeks to contribute to a growing body of 
literature that highlights the importance of ideational factors for the explanation of 
political phenomena by putting forward the argument that ideational factors do not 
eliminate political agency; rather, they channel it.   
 
 
IDEAS AND THE POLICY PROCESS 
 
The growing interest in the impact of ideational factors on the policy process is an 
important development in the study of politics in advanced industrialized societies.  
Ideational factors have been conceptualized in a number of ways8 varying from 
cognitive frames and norms to expertise and beliefs but existing analyses typically 
stress the importance of the normative and the cognitive aspects of these factors.  
Thus, ideational factors have been shown to affect the definition of actors’ interests 
and strategies as well as the outcomes of political battles.9  Although the autonomous 
impact of these factors has been contested by those who claim that it is, at best, 
epiphenomenal (i.e. it covers more consequential factors such as interests), the real 
challenge for the exponents of ideational analyses is to reconcile their arguments 
with the notion of agency.  For that purpose, ideas-based arguments must be tested in 
a variety of settings in addition to (and beyond) the crystallized structures of the 
nation state.   
 
The EU provides an interesting testing ground.  A product of purposeful actors 
(nation states), it has become a new opportunity structure which affects both its 
creators and other, non-state, actors.  Given that integration has hitherto privileged 
the removal of barriers to economic activity, the issue arises as to the way in which 
sectoral peculiarities are (if at all) taken into account.  From the perspective of the 
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national governments this is an important issue because they are often held to 
account for EU policies that they control only imperfectly.  They are often faced with 
competing demands that call for value judgments.  These judgments must, however, 
be made in a specific context underpinned by material (e.g. institutional) and 
immaterial factors.   
 
The EU, like all organizations facing a novel decision situation, typically uses its 
existing standard operating procedures and institutional repertoires.10  These are 
adjusted only marginally, when that is deemed to be required.  This is often the case 
in the European Commission’s use of its powers in the field of competition, which 
often leads public and private actors to realize that a given practice is simply 
untenable and must be changed.  However, deciding how the EU ought to deal with 
such cases once they appear on the agenda and, in particular, how far it can (or even 
ought to) go is much less straightforward.  Its activity is shaped by wider social, 
political, economic, and other considerations.  This is especially so in cases where 
the market has evolved and developed new practices that are not regulated, when 
there is no regulatory framework at all—national or European—to build on or when 
there is conflict between existing national regulation and EU legal provisions.  The 
role of ideas can be important in cases of this kind.   
 
In that context, the European Commission is mandated by the Treaty to assess the 
unique characteristics of the economic activity in question and act accordingly.  
Hence, it must identify and interpret the requirements of a given economic activity 
and reconcile them with the principles enunciated by the Treaty.  The Treaty allows 
the Commission to choose an appropriate method of action but how far can it go in 
implementing a provision of the Treaty in a specific case?  This is the cardinal 
difficulty that the Commission faces in implementing broad Treaty provisions in 
previously untested areas.   
 
Ideas affect this process through their operational and political characteristics.  Some 
ideas are easier to put into effect than others, because (i) they resonate more with the 
cardinal characteristics of a given decision situation and (ii) they are embedded in the 
standard operating procedures of given political actors.  On the other hand, the 
political appeal of ideas relates primarily to their capacity to (i) legitimize some 
forms of political action (but not others) and (ii) facilitate the creation of coalitions of 
political actors.   
 
The next section focuses on the reform of the system of transfer regulations in 
European professional football.  The now famous Bosman ruling of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) highlighted the incompatibility of the previous regime with 
key provisions of the Treaty and rendered change unavoidable but it did not resolve a 
key issue.  How far should change go and how should the Commission – the 
‘guardian of the Treaty’, apply the principles of the free movement of workers and 
the free provision of services to the area of professional sport where there was no 
sport-specific Treaty provision and no secondary EU legislation (directive, 
regulation, decision)?  The analysis that follows is an attempt to demonstrate that the 
socially constructed and institutionalized idea that sport is both a 
professional/economic activity as well as an educative, social and recreational one 
has guided, legitimized and constrained the role of the Commission and has also 
affected the new system of transfer regulations.   
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THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
 
The pre-Bosman era 
Until 2001, European professional footballers did not have the right to ‘resign’ from 
one ‘job’ with one club and find another while their contract was in force.  Indeed, 
unlike most professionals working in the EU, they either had to wait until the end of 
their contract11 or a freely-agreed transfer fee had to be agreed between the two 
clubs.  This system contravened the free movement of workers and the provision of 
services, i.e. two fundamental principles of the single European market.  However, 
the European Commission did not utilize its powers of guardian of the Treaty (Art. 
226/169 of the Treaty) against this practice because doing so would imply that 
professional football was merely an economic activity like any other that is regulated 
by EU law.  The idea that sport in Europe is much more than a mere economic 
activity was at the heart of the Commission’s action during the 1990s.  Indeed, it was 
this idea that both guided and limited the executive role of the Commission in its 
attempt to resolve a conflict between broad provisions of the treaty and historically-
defined practices.   
 
The free movement of workers and the free provision of services were at the heart of 
the process of economic integration that was re-launched in the mid-1980s.  These 
principles were to be implemented in a gradual, incremental manner.12  Indeed, art. 
63 of the Treaty of Rome stipulated that the abolition of the restrictions to the free 
provision of services should follow a programme setting out the general conditions 
under which and the stages by which each type of service was to be liberalized.  This 
reflected the need to take into account service/sector-specific peculiarities and 
requirements.   
 
Nevertheless, professional football remained outside the remit of this legislative 
programme, for three reasons.  First, Art. 63 of the Treaty gave priority ‘to those 
services which directly affect production costs or the liberalization of which helps to 
promote trade in goods’13.  Second, the economic dimension of professional football 
had not yet acquired a high profile.  Finally, the very idea of the involvement of the 
EC/EU in this area of activity was problematic because the Treaty contained no 
corresponding specific provision.  This view was also supported by the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ.   
 
Indeed, when a Dutch court asked the ECJ to decide in 1974 whether the Treaty 
applied to sport, the ECJ ruled that ‘the practice of sport is subject to Community law 
only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Art. 2 of 
the Treaty’14.  The ECJ subsequently reaffirmed this view15 and specified that Treaty 
provisions ‘do not prevent the adoption of regulations or of a practice excluding 
foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an 
economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches 
and are thus of sporting interest only’16.   
 
This jurisprudence of the ECJ is of cardinal importance, for two reasons.  First, the 
ECJ accepted that sporting activities have more than a mere economic dimension but 
it did not define their characteristics.  Second, the ECJ accepted that when the Treaty 
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applies to the economic dimension of sport, exemptions are acceptable to the extent 
that they are based on the ‘particular nature and context’ of the relevant activities.  
For example, competitions between national teams that, by definition, exclude 
foreign players are acceptable under EC/EU law.  These two aspects of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ are causally linked.  Exemptions enunciated by the Treaty 
are acceptable precisely because of the specificity of sporting activities that have 
both an economic and other dimensions.   
 
At the same time, central aspects of the organization of sporting activities clearly 
violated Treaty provisions.  In the past professional football clubs were not allowed 
to employ more than two foreign players, even if these players were citizens of a 
member state.  This regulation breached the free movement of workers and the free 
provision of services enunciated by the Treaty.  The possibility of further legal action 
under the Treaty did not change the attitude of UEFA (Union of European Football 
Associations, the body that governs European football), which consistently tried to 
divert pressure emanating from the Commission.   
 
Already in 1978 UEFA had given an undertaking to Etienne Davignon, then 
Commissioner in charge of industrial affairs and the single market, that it would 
abolish the limitations on the number of EC footballers who were employed by 
football clubs in the member states but concrete action did not follow.  The re-launch 
of the single market project in the mid-1980s could have produced a ‘bandwagon 
effect’ against such restrictive practices.  However, this did not happen.  The officials 
of the European Commission had to overcome not only the lack of a sport-specific 
Treaty provision but also the opposition of Jacques Delors, then President of the 
Commission.   
 
Delors, a keen football fan with links to a number of top club and league officials17, 
believed that the EC had no powers to deal with this issue.  When in 1986 he realized 
that in the course of an otherwise routine investigation regarding compliance with the 
free movement of workers, Commission officials were considering the possibility of 
taking legal action against clubs under the Commission’s powers of guardian of the 
Treaties, Delors confronted Manuel Marín, then Commissioner in charge of social 
affairs, who was supporting the stance of the officials of his department.  When 
Delors realized that Marín was unwilling to give in, he reassigned responsibility for 
this dossier to Peter Sutherland, then Commissioner in charge of competition policy, 
so as to ‘bury’ the issue altogether.18  Arguably, the same logic permeated the 
gentlemen’s agreement concluded in 1992 by Martin Bangemann, then Vice-
President of the European Commission, and UEFA.  This agreement introduced the 
so-called ‘three plus two rule’ that allowed football clubs to have up to three foreign 
footballers.   
 
This small change clearly fell short of a radical overhaul of the regulations governing 
the transfer of footballers within the EU.  Throughout the 1990s, the Commission 
received a significant number of complaints regarding the transfer system while, as 
Parrish notes, a body of opinion was gradually emerging at the level of the EU 
‘seeking to give the socio-cultural and integrationist qualities of sport a higher 
priority’19.  This was also exemplified by the Declaration attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997.  The Declaration highlighted the ‘social significance of sport’ 
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and although it was not legally binding it was a political message that EU institutions 
were expected to take into account when they dealt with issues affecting sport.20   
 
The now famous Bosman case21 put the issue of the radical overhaul of the transfer 
system back on the agenda.  Jean-Marc Bosman, a determined Belgian professional 
football player, took legal action that brought about a sea change in European 
football.   
 
The Bosman case as a critical juncture 
Bosman was a professional player of RC Liégois.  When his contract expired, the 
French club US du Littoral de Dunkerque offered to employ him and concluded an 
agreement with him and a separate agreement with his former employer, RC Liégois.  
RC Liégois, doubtful about the French club’s solvency, did not ask the Belgian 
League to issue the certificate that was required for the successful completion of the 
transfer.  As a result, the contracts did not enter into force.  In addition, the Belgian 
club suspended Bosman, thereby preventing him from playing for the entire season.  
Bosman took the Belgian club to the Belgian courts which subsequently asked the 
ECJ to interpret Art. 48 of the Treaty of Rome (free movement of workers) in 
relation to the regulations governing the transfer of professional footballers.  More 
specifically, the Belgian court sought to ascertain whether this provision precluded 
the application of UEFA-sponsored national regulations under which a professional 
player could not, upon the expiry of his contract, be employed by a club based in 
another member state unless the latter paid a fee to his former employer.  After 
reaffirming its views regarding the specificity of sport, the ECJ ruled that the 
aforementioned regulations violated the free movement of workers that directly 
affected players’ access to the employment market in another member state.22  
Furthermore, the ECJ condemned the aforementioned gentlemen’s agreement 
between the Commission and UEFA regarding the ‘three plus two rule’.   
 
This was a landmark ruling for two reasons.  First, the ECJ reaffirmed the view that 
sporting activities were multifaceted and that EU law applied to the economic facet 
of those activities.  Second, it dealt a heavy blow to a key component of the 
regulations governing the transfer of professional footballers, the edifice that had 
hitherto exemplified the ‘specificity’ of sport.  It obliged UEFA and FIFA 
(International Federation of Football Associations)—the game’s governing bodies 
that were previously immune to external pressures—to reconsider this edifice in its 
entirety23.  In that sense, the ruling opened a path that the Commission (in its 
capacity of guardian of the Treaties) and the game’s governing bodies had to follow.   
 
Nevertheless, the cardinal question remained unanswered: how far should the 
Commission go in promoting the implementation of the free movement of workers 
and the free provision of services in this particular area?  What guided and limited its 
action in an area where (a) the powers of the EU remained hard to define and (b) the 
Commission’s past activity had been criticized by the ECJ?  In other words, what are 
the characteristics of the specificity of sport?  How far and in what way should they 
be taken into account in the implementation of the aforementioned legally binding 
freedoms in this area?   
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The specificity of sport as political weapon 
The continuing opposition of UEFA and FIFA, and the active involvement of 
government leaders (especially those of Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) 
who overtly supported a ‘cautious’ and ‘balanced’ approach24 while covertly and 
fiercely opposing substantive change, further complicated the task of the European 
Commission25 and highlighted the eminently political nature of this issue.  This was 
unsurprising given that - unlike FIFA which has little direct contact with clubs, 
UEFA maintains direct links with football clubs, in particular the so-called ‘G14’, a 
Brussels-based organization that represents now eighteen wealthy and very powerful 
European football clubs26 that vehemently opposed change27.  Given that these 
arguments were used by ‘an industry of considerable commercial significance’28, 
they could be dismissed as a delaying tactic, but the issue was far from clear-cut.   
 
The Commission was puzzled because it knew what it had to avoid (i.e. the pre-
Bosman arrangement) but it could not assess the precise implications of the 
alternative options.  These options were as follows:  
it could simply remain inactive thereby obliging the clubs and football’s governing 
bodies to reform the regulations.  This was a risky option because many clubs 
opposed change (thus, at that point they were not a credible implementer of change) 
and the complete liberalization of the system would deprive small clubs, football’s 
grassroots organization, of the income they need and receive when they ‘sell’ players 
to wealthy clubs;  
it could seek a gentlemen’s agreement – the legislative option being excluded due to 
the lack of a legal basis in the Treaty.   
In both cases, the key question remained the same: how far should change go?  
Should transfer fees be abolished?  If not, how should they be calculated?  Should 
one rely on the pure logic of the market?   
 
The specificity of sport as a guide and limit 
After the Bosman ruling, the implementation by the European Commission of the 
principle of the free movement of workers and the free provision of services in 
professional football was guided, legitimized, and constrained by the embedded 
social dimension of sport and the need to protect, as much as possible, small clubs—
the grassroots organizational unit of football—from the potentially negative 
consequences of the Bosman ruling.   
 
This ruling did not explicitly address certain problematic aspects of the regulations 
governing the transfer of players whose contracts have not expired.  For example, 
even after this ruling, clubs enjoyed an unfettered right unilaterally to define the 
amount that another club had to pay to acquire the services of a footballer under 
contract.  Unlike most other professionals, footballers under contract did not have the 
right to resign from one job and freely get another.  This fundamental rule of the 
international transfer system was clearly incompatible with the principles of free 
movement of workers and the free provision of services within the emerging single 
European market.  The impact of the Bosman ruling could not (and did not) remain 
confined to the post-contractual stage.  Rather, it forced the officials of the European 
Commission, UEFA and FIFA to realize that the time had finally come for a change 
in the regulations that governed the contractual stage as well.   
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The task they faced was extremely complex because the ECJ had not defined the 
specific content of the non-economic dimension of sport.  Thus, the frontier between 
the economic aspects of sport (where EU law applies) and the non-economic aspects 
(where EU law does not apply) had to be defined as well as acted upon.  In addition, 
the relative autonomy of the Commission had been curtailed by the ECJ’s criticism 
of the ‘three plus two rule’.  Moreover, the Commission was facing strong opposition 
from FIFA and UEFA, whose officials argued that football was a special case and 
should be treated accordingly.   
 
Nevertheless, this argument had been undermined by the increasingly spectacular 
amounts paid by top European clubs for the services of footballers,29 the emergence 
of new market practices such as the acquisition by investment companies of 
controlling stakes in several football clubs,30 the increasing involvement of private 
television channels in the definition of key aspects of European as well as national 
and world football tournaments in exchange for astronomical sums31 and the 
spiraling cost of top players’ wages.  In that sense, the Bosman ruling simply 
highlighted the change that had already taken place and to a large extent provided 
ammunition to the Commission whose officials argued that ‘if the sporting world 
behaves as an economic industry, it shall be regulated accordingly’32.   
 
Faced with this situation and the unwillingness of football’s governing bodies to 
devise a new system that would comply with EU law, the Commission had to use its 
powers under competition law, which is what it typically does when it attempts to 
liberalize previously protected or uncompetitive markets.  Commission officials 
focused on one key argument:33 the use of transfer fees agreed between clubs 
amounted to a restrictive practice that contravened EU competition law because the 
definition of the fees was not based on a clear, objective and transparent criterion that 
would reflect actual training costs.  Moreover, FIFA defined the transfer regulations 
unilaterally34.  Finally, players did not have the right to resign and were therefore 
deprived of the right to provide their services freely.   
 
This logic, which permeated the stance of the European Commission throughout the 
1990s, along with the Bosman ruling of the ECJ raised the issue of change and 
highlighted the main aspect of the system of transfer regulations that ought to be 
changed.  However, it could not provide a guiding device for the definition of the 
new system primarily because of the particular nature of football in particular, and 
sport in general.  This particularity consists of a number of key elements which 
demonstrated that the arguments against change had a clear practical basis.   
 
First, unlike other private firms, professional football teams need a degree of stability 
in terms of personnel so that they can successfully pursue their objectives.  The full 
implementation of the principles of free movement and free provision of services in 
this sector could allow players to move from one club to another in a manner that 
would severely undermine the clubs’ ability to compete.  Wealthy clubs would be 
able to attract the best players throughout the football season by paying even higher 
wages.  This would lead to two very important consequences.  It would undermine 
the capacity of less well-off clubs to compete.  More importantly, small clubs 
renowned for their ability to identify, train and sometimes even educate young 
talented players35 would no longer be able to perform this vital function.  If players 
were allowed to benefit from the unfettered implementation of the aforementioned 
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freedoms, those clubs that are typically small would be unable to rely on transfer fees 
and the key income they secure by selling players.  In short, the unfettered 
implementation of the principles enunciated by the Treaty would deal a fatal blow to 
the structure of football.   
 
Second, the nature of competition in sport is special since it relies, at least in part, on 
the concepts of equal opportunity, fair play and solidarity.36  Unlike other economic 
activities, football clubs do not seek to dominate in a manner that completely 
eradicates competition.  Rather, winning in football (and other sports) is meaningful 
only to the extent that opponents remain reasonably able to compete.  In other words, 
‘there is an interdependence of interest between participants in sporting 
competition’.37   
 
Third, a player’s career usually starts at a young age and does not last for many 
years.  Indeed, a footballer’s professional career typically comes to an end soon after 
the age of thirty.   
 
Fourth, the number of professional athletes in Europe is estimated at a mere 15,000–
20,000.38  They originate in either the amateur sector or school sports.  One of the 
key characteristics of the organization of sport in Europe is the principle of solidarity 
that links the various levels of sporting practice, from recreational to top-level 
professional sport.  Its protection is a key function performed by sports federations.   
 
Fifth, the ‘pyramid structure’39 of these organizations may give sporting federations a 
practical ‘monopoly’ which in principle constitutes a violation of EU competition 
law.  This form of organization had negative effects on players’ rights.  Indeed, 
players were deprived of the right, typically enjoyed by other employees, to take 
legal action in national courts when they felt that their rights had been violated.  This 
archaic system exemplifies the autonomy of sports federations and is largely a 
residue of amateurism.  However, it would be absurd to have, for example, two or 
more national federations making arrangements for two national teams, competing 
internationally to host the same sporting events, organizing two cup competitions, 
etc.   
 
The advent of the new system of transfer regulations 
The Commission’s use of its powers under competition law, which, by definition, 
focuses on the economic aspects of sport, was not an indication of its unwillingness 
to acknowledge and act upon the peculiar nature of sport.  Rather, it served a tactical 
purpose namely, the opening of the debate regarding the new system of transfer 
regulations.  The idea that sport is a peculiar type of ‘industry’ was evident in the 
arguments used by Commissioners and Commission officials during the preparation 
of the new system of regulations.40  The arguments used by Commission officials in 
the ECJ were also illustrative of this twofold strategy.  They acknowledged that if 
clubs are to maintain a minimum of stability which is a vital element of their ability 
to compete, it is necessary to restrict the number and the duration of ‘transfer 
windows’, i.e. the periods in which transfers between clubs of players under contract 
can take place.   
 
The strict implementation of the principles of the free movement of workers and the 
free provision of services in the field of professional football would preclude this 
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measure.  In essence, the stance adopted by the Commission was an indication of its 
willingness to acknowledge and respect the specificity of sport and to combine it 
with the need for change in the football transfer system in accordance with (a) EU 
law and (b) the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  The new principles that govern only the 
transfer of professional football players between member states41 exemplify this twin 
strategy promoted by the European Commission.   
 
The number of transfer windows has been limited to two per season but each player 
is allowed to move only once every year.  Contracts can last between one (minimum) 
and five (maximum) years.42  Unilateral breaches of contract are possible only at the 
end of the season.  The principle of financial compensation is maintained.  A fee is 
paid if a contract is breached unilaterally (either by a player or a club).  Young 
players and the interests of the clubs that train them will be protected.  Indeed, for 
players under the age of 23, a system of training compensation has been put in place 
to encourage and reward the training efforts of clubs.  In addition, international 
transfers of players under the age of 18 will only be authorized subject to agreed 
conditions, and the football authorities will establish and enforce a code of conduct 
to guarantee the sporting, training and academic education of these players.  
Solidarity mechanisms will be created that will redistribute a significant proportion 
of income to clubs involved in the training and education of players, including 
amateur clubs.43  An arbitration body will be created with members chosen in equal 
numbers by players and clubs and with an independent chairman but arbitration will 
be voluntary and will no longer rule out recourse to national (civil) courts.   
 
This set of principles has been transposed into FIFA’s regulations on international 
transfers in July 2001 and came into force in September 2001.  Moreover, following 
the Commission’s call on FIFA and UEFA to encourage dialogue between clubs and 
players, FIFA and FIFPro (the ‘umbrella organization’ that represents professional 
footballers’ associations) have reached an agreement regarding FIFPro’s 
involvement in the implementation of the new regulations.  The new principles 
introduce a number of key changes which embody a unique combination of the 
principles enunciated by EU legislation, on the one hand, and the specific nature of 
sport (and football) on the other.   
 
From the players’ perspective, the new system44 is beneficial because it affords them 
more freedom and enables them to protect their rights effectively.  Despite these 
changes clubs can still maintain a minimum of stability as only two transfer windows 
per season and only one move per season per player are now allowed.  Moreover, the 
introduction of an objective (as opposed to an arbitrary) system for the calculation of 
transfer fees allows them to limit their operating costs.  Finally, small clubs that 
operate ‘academies’ and similar schemes can still count on the income generated by 
transfer fees.  However, the key question relates to the manner in which the role of 
the Commission was shaped.   
 
What are the operational and political characteristics of the system that have allowed 
the Commission to consent to it?  Arguably, the final outcome has a number of 
characteristics which reflect the idea that sport is a multifaceted activity whose 
unique nature must be taken into account in the course of implementing the freedoms 
of (a) movement of workers and (b) provision of services.   
 
- 10 - 
From the Commission’s perspective, the final outcome is the result of internal 
consensus the lack of which had undermined the role of the EU’s executive body in 
the crucial period of the mid-to late 1980s.  Indeed, the involvement of 
Commissioners Monti (competition), Reding (education and culture) and 
Diamantopoulou (employment and social affairs) after 1999 reflects this consensus 
as well as the multifaceted nature of sport.   
 
Moreover, this agreement does not entail the use of new EU legislation.  The 
Commission managed to avoid the submission of a new legislative proposal, at a 
time when the emphasis of political discourse at the level of the EU had shifted to the 
need for reform along neo-liberal lines.  Thus, it has also avoided accusations of 
excessive activism by using existing structures to reach the desired outcome.   
 
The actual implementation of the final outcome relies on the action of national, 
European and international federations whose autonomy is largely preserved.  This 
enhances the legitimacy of the implementation process.  The autonomy of the world 
of sport is a concept that the Commission intends to build on by promoting 
Commissioner Diamantopoulou’s idea of a collective agreement45 that will bring 
together representatives of clubs, federations and players.  The objective is to re-
balance the structures that govern European football, to make them more 
representative and to improve other aspects of professional football such as working 
conditions, the calendar of football events, and the regulation of resting time, in a 
manner that resonates with (a) the wider normative order that underpins the operation 
of the single market (social market economy) and (b) the positive experience of the 
member states (e.g. Spain, France, Denmark and the Netherlands) where a national 
collective agreement is already in place.46   
 
The final outcome was also congruent (to some extent) with the ‘European social 
model’.  It has allowed the Commission to avoid the charge typically made against it 
that it promotes ultra-liberal policies, while managing to promote the free movement 
of workers and the free provision of services in a proportional manner.  In fact, the 
Commission has offered no guarantees as to the compatibility of the new system with 
the Treaty.  Commissioner Reding pointed out that Commissioner Monti (who had 
the lead in this dossier) did not sign an agreement with the interested parties.47  
Moreover, Commission officials were eager to stress (interview with European 
Commission official, 19 September 2001) that quite a lot will depend on the capacity 
of FIFA, UEFA and, above all, FIFPro48 to protect the new system from players who 
may wish to bring a test case to the ECJ49.  It is clear that the involvement of the 
Commission in the handling of this issue has not been a happy occasion for the EU’s 
executive body.  Mario Monti’s assertion that this marks ‘the end of the 
Commission’s involvement in disputes between players, clubs and football 
organizations’50 is indicative of this sense.  In addition, the recent efforts made to 





The purpose of this article was to explore the role of ideas in the transformation of 
broad Treaty-based principles into concrete reality in previously unchartered 
territory.  Sport is a multifaceted activity but the EU can only regulate the economic 
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facets.  Faced with this reality, the Commission tried to reconcile Treaty-based 
obligations with the demands of the broader, non-economic facets of sport.  In the 
analysis of this case, a twofold argument has been put forward.   
 
Ideas are road maps that direct executive activity, legitimize and constrain it by 
articulating the relevant deeply embedded conceptions regarding the nature of the 
activity concerned.  Ideas play this role by means of their operational and political 
characteristics, i.e. by resolving operational problems in a way that directly resonates 
with the normative order that underpins the institutional context in which political 
decisions are made and implemented.  The ‘flipside’ of this argument concerns the 
use of ideas by self-interested political actors who seek to legitimize their own views 
and activity.  In that sense, ideas are ‘weapons’ used by actors in their quest to 
protect and promote their interests.51  This paradoxically supports the first claim.  
Political actors use ideas precisely when these ideas are seen as legitimate and 
shared.  This is when they are politically consequential.   
 
The socially constructed notion that sport is much more than an economic activity 
did not allow the Commission to simply rest on the ECJ’s Bosman ruling, which it 
had the power to do.  Rather, the Commission had to help find a way to reconcile it 
with the ECJ jurisprudence.  On the other hand, the same notion has been used by the 
supporters of the status quo as a weapon in their new attempt to stifle change.  Both 
were legitimate uses of the same idea but they also reflected wider concerns 
regarding the potentially negative implications of the unfettered implementation of 
the free movement of workers and the free provision of services on sport in general 
and football in particular.  In that sense, it can be argued that the idea that sport is a 
peculiar and multifaceted industry both channeled and constrained the debate (and its 
outcome) regarding the regulation of sport.   
 
The central conclusion that can be drawn from this case concerns the relationship 
between ideas and agency.  The role of ideas in political processes has been criticized 
for placing excessive emphasis on contextual (here immaterial) factors to such an 
extent that they obscure the important role of agents.  This article has sought to 
contribute to a growing body of literature52 that highlights the fact that reliance of 
ideas as explanatory factors does not necessarily ignore the role of agency.  In fact, 
ideas channel agency.  Agents are constrained by the ideas that constitute the broader 
normative context in which they operate.  On the other hand, they also use ideas as 
weapons in an attempt to make their arguments more appealing.  In that sense, ideas 
are both constraints and resources.   
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